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Providing the wherewithal for deficit countries to finance temporary balance- 
of-payment deficits was one of the major concerns of those who worked on 
the design of a new  international monetary system after the Second World 
War.  In the literature, this aspect of  the Bretton Woods  system has become 
known as the problem of the provision of international liquidity. In view of 
the importance of the topic, it is not surprising that there already exist several 
excellent and comprehensive surveys of this issue.’ These surveys show that, 
until the early 1970s, much of  the academic debate could be understood as 
attempting to provide answers to the following questions: (1) What deter- 
mines the demand for international reserves by  central banks? (2) What de- 
termines the supply of reserves in the Bretton Woods system? (3) What is the 
desired composition of reserves, and what happens if  the actual composition 
differs from that? (4) To the extent that additional outside reserves are created 
by  fiat, who should benefit from the associated seignorage? The analysis of 
the first two questions was intended to provide the basis for an evaluation of 
the extent to which the system provided for an adequate quantity of reserves. 
The third question concerned the  so-called confidence problem (or Triffin 
[  19601 dilemma), and the fourth became identified with the “link proposal,” 
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1. See, in particular, Williamson (1973), Cohen (1975), andBlack (1985). Gardner (1969) and 
Horsefield (1969) contain detailed descriptions of  the evolution of  the content of the two main 
alternative proposals, the White plan and the Keynes plan, and the negotiations and debate that 
surrounded them. 
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according to which international reserve creation should be used to finance aid 
to developing countries. 
The methodology used in the analysis of  these questions and the answers 
arrived at in the literature are thoroughly treated in the reviews by Williamson 
(1973) and Cohen (1975), and we shall not devote much of our analysis to a 
replication of their studies. 
In the mid-l970s, the focus of the literature on liquidity within the Bretton 
Woods system shifted. Rather than asking whether the system provided ade- 
quate reserves for the financing of  balance-of-payments deficits, questions 
pertaining to its inflationary consequences became prominent. In  part,  this 
development reflected a change in the perception of what the main current of 
policy concern was, from unemployment to inflation. Thus, the “adequacy” 
of international reserve growth came increasingly to be judged by criteria re- 
lating to the maintenance of price stability in the (fixed-exchange-rate)  world 
economy. In part, it also reflected a change in the analytic toolbox of econo- 
mists, away from models based on fixed prices where income bore the burden 
of  adjustment toward models in which full employment was maintained by 
price flexibility, away from partial equilibrium models of current-account de- 
termination toward general equilibrium models, and, perhaps most important, 
away from models that implicitly assumed no or little international mobility 
of capital toward models in which this mobility was assumed to be perfect. 
In this paper, we begin in the next section by  reviewing the meanings that 
have been attached to the term international liquidity. We  argue that interna- 
tional liquidity is a fuzzy concept and that its most frequent definition-inter- 
national reserves plus the value of  unconditional borrowing facilities-fails 
to capture the most usual meaning of that concept when private international 
capital movements are substantial. International liquidity thus defined, how- 
ever, turns out to be a most useful concept in an examination of the link be- 
tween the growth and composition of  international reserves, national mone- 
tary  policy,  the world  money  stock,  and the medium-run course of  world 
inflation. Definitions of these concepts are also introduced and discussed in 
section 5.1, which,  in addition, emphasizes that any definition of  interna- 
tional liquidity has a relatively clear meaning only in a fixed-exchange-rate 
regime. 
Section 5.2 turns to a brief comparison of the views about the nature, role, 
and provision of  international liquidity contained in the American proposal 
for a Stabilization Fund and the British proposal for a Clearing Union, and 
section 5.3 examines how the provision of international liquidity is dealt with 
in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. 
The next two sections are concerned with the actual evolution of  intema- 
tional liquidity in the system. Section 5.4 presents time-series data on various 
measures of  the overall volume of  international reserves and other interna- 
tional monetary aggregates as well as on the composition of these magnitudes. 
Section 5.5 turns to a comparison of various mechanisms by which interna- 271  The Provision of  Liquidity in the Bretton Woods System 
tional liquidity can be provided.  It  pays particular attention to the contrast 
between “outside” and  “inside” reserve assets, to the relation between the 
composition of  international liquidity and its overall supply, and to possible 
sources of asymmetry in the provision of liquidity in a stylized model of the 
money supply process implicit in the functioning of the Bretton Woods system 
during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Section 5.6 turns to the question that became the focal point of many stud- 
ies from the mid- 1970s, namely, the relation between international liquidity, 
world inflation, and economic activity. It also presents the results of a simple 
econometric model that attempts to determine jointly the quantity and distri- 
bution of  international reserves (between the United States and the rest of the 
GI0 world), the evolution of the world money supply, and the rate of  world 
inflation. 
In the penultimate section, we discuss the role of international liquidity in 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. We  draw on the earlier discus- 
sion to argue that, although other explanations such as an inadequate supply 
or composition of international liquidity or disequilibrium exchange rates are 
part of  the symptoms of  the breakdown, an unwillingness to live up to the 
consequences and the logic of the dollar(-gold) reserve system as it actually 
functioned, with the prominent influence it gave to U.S.  monetary policy, 
played a large role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime. 
We  conclude in section 5.8 by attempting to draw some lessons from the 
way liquidity was provided under Bretton Woods and from the breakdown of 
that system for the proper design of  fixed-exchange-rate regimes, notably of 
the European Monetary Union variety. 
5.1  International Liquidity: Concepts and Measurement 
The term international  liquidity is generally used to refer to those assets 
available to the authorities of a country for the purpose of stabilizing the ex- 
ternal value of the domestic currency. A slightly more precise definition spec- 
ifies that internutional liquidity refers to those resources at the disposal of the 
authorities to finance external imbalances without having to engage in any 
form of  domestic adjustment measures.* These definitions thus suggest that 
central bank holdings of foreign exchange should certainly be included in the 
measure of international liquidity. Since unconditional borrowing rights can 
2. This definition of international  liquidiry implies a certain degree of ambiguity in the notion 
of an adequate level of liquidity. Since financing of deficits cannot take place indefinitely, adjust- 
ment will have to be undertaken at some point if the balance-of-payments deficit is persistent. 
Otherwise, the only adequate level of liquidity would be an infinite one. Some time dimension 
will therefore have to be included in the analysis. 
As will become clear further in the text, this more precise definition also becomes difficult to 
implement statistically when capital mobility is high. We will argue that, for some purposes, it 
may be better to replace “to finance external imbalances” with “to intervene in the foreign ex- 
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also be used to acquire convertible currencies for the purpose of  currency 
stabilization and balance-of-payments financing, it has been argued that these 
too should be included in a measure of liquidity on either of the above criteria. 
Thus, the surveys of both Black (1985) and Cohen (1975) consider a country’s 
international liquidity to be measured by the sum of its central bank’s owned 
international reserves and its unconditional borrowing rights. Concretely, this 
implies that international liquidity “consists of gold, convertible foreign ex- 
change, reserve position in the International Monetary Fund,  and  Special 
Drawing Rights” (Williamson 1973,687). 
Even if one accepts that international liquidity refers to the resources avail- 
able to the authorities for the purpose of financing payments imbalances with- 
out having to initiate adjustment measures, there are no objections to the pre- 
cise measure that has been proposed. One of  these concerns the nature of 
unconditional borrowing rights. For instance, suppose that two central banks 
conclude an agreement to create a swap facility that can be activated at the 
simple request of  one of the parties. Should not the size of  this facility be 
regarded as liquidity? If  so, what about informal agreements between central 
bank governors to assist each other in  times of  “disruptions in  the foreign 
exchange markets” and the possibility for the central bank to borrow convert- 
ible currencies from private-sector banks? 
An even more fundamental problem with the traditional definition of inter- 
national liquidity is that it implicitly assumes that private international capital 
mobility is low. To  see this, consider the implications of the complete opposite 
assumption, namely, that capital mobility is perfect both in the sense of the 
absence of legal or administrative barriers and in the sense of perfect substi- 
tutability between domestic and foreign assets. To  what extent does this as- 
sumption affect a central bank’s ability to finance balance-of-payment deficits 
without having to initiate adjustment measures? To  analyze this question, 
imagine that a country is faced with a negative shock to the demand for its 
exports. In order to prevent a fall in income or a change in interest rates, a 
domestic fiscal expansion is called for. In the absence of private capital move- 
ments, the entire shortfall of export demand will need to be financed by inter- 
national liquidity as defined above. Suppose instead that capital is perfectly 
mobile. Now  the reduction in the demand for exports can be automatically 
financed by  the private sector at the original interest rate and employment 
level, provided the country is small enough to have but a negligible effect on 
foreign variables, most notably foreign interest rates. In other words, no offi- 
cial international liquidity is needed in order to finance the balance of  trade 
deficit even though the country has engaged in no domestic adjustment mea- 
sures.’ 
3. A corollary to the proposition that international liquidity is a difficult concept to define when 
capital is highly mobile is that models of  the demand for international reserves by monetary au- 
thorities must then be.  based on other arguments than the need to finance payments imbalances. 
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To illustrate the importance of capital mobility further, consider an increase 
in the world interest rate facing a small country. In the limiting case of  per- 
fectly integrated financial markets, no amount of liquidity would be sufficient 
to finance the resulting balance-of-payments deficit if the authorities insisted 
on not undertaking any adjustment measures at all, including that of aligning 
the domestic interest rate with the foreign one. Conversely, if  the domestic 
interest rate were adjusted appropriately, the authorities could maintain the 
stability of  the exchange rate without having recourse to any international 
liquidity at all. 
In view of the importance of the degree of  capital mobility for the issue 
under discussion, it is perhaps useful to point out that it is not only the exis- 
tence or absence of  fegal restrictions on capital movements that is important 
in this ~ontext.~  There existed many ways to circumvent such restrictions 
given sufficient incentives. One that policymakers had to take particularly into 
account was the so-called leads and lags in payments for commercial transac- 
tions. Such leads and lags often substituted for capital movements through 
more open channels and appeared in the balance-of-payments statistics in the 
errors and omissions component. Exactly how mobile capital was during the 
Bretton Woods regime is ultimately therefore an empirical question. Many 
estimates of so-called offset coefficients suggest a high degree of capital mo- 
bility  among  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD) countries during that period.5 It is also relevant to note here that the 
measure of capital mobility most relevant for the purpose at hand involves a 
time dimension. Taking a horizon of two to four quarters, a number that seems 
reasonable when we discuss issues of  policy effectiveness, we  would argue 
that the degree of capital mobility under the Bretton Woods regime was quite 
high between industrial countries, especially during its latter years. 
The basic problem that arises when attempting to define and measure inter- 
national liquidity, as Fritz Machlup (1966) argued long ago, is that the concept 
is used in different, often inadequately specified meanings in different places 
and by different authors. The concept is taken to refer sometimes to the quan- 
tity of  some asset and other times to its “quality,” sometimes to a stock and 
others times to a flow, etc. The basic difficulty in defining international liquid- 
ity is similar to that in defining money and moneyness or, for that matter, in 
agreeing on what one means by  a balance-of-payments disequilibrium  and 
how to measure it. The simplest way to deal with the problem is to avoid using 
the concept altogether. Without going so far, one could adopt a simple, un- 
ambiguous, and measurable definition and use the term international liquidity 
only in that sense. This is the practice that we will adopt in much of the re- 
mainder of this paper. 
4. Indeed, many participants in the conference referred to such restrictions to argue that capital 
5. For examples of such studies, see Genberg (1976). Kouri (1975), and Obstfeld (1980). 
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By international liquidity we will mean the stocks of  assets readily avail- 
able to national monetary authorities to buy back their own currency in  the 
foreign exchange market in the course of their exchange-rate stabilization op- 
erations. By  international  liquidity,  we  thus mean official international re- 
serves as usually measured. This definition has the advantage of having as an 
empirical counterpart the measure of international liquidity used in the early 
surveys referred to above. It also has the advantage of identifying changes in 
a country’s stock of international liquidity with its official settlements balance- 
of-payments surpluses of  deficits. That, then, is the definition to which we 
shall try to adhere in our presentation of data and when developing our own 
analysis, although, when commenting on the literature, we will not be able to 
avoid referring to international liquidity in the broader senses in which it has 
been used. The context should make it clear which of these concepts we are 
dealing with. 
The questions that we are interested in-the  adequacy of  “liquidity” or in- 
ternational reserves, the mechanisms by which it is created and distributed, 
and the link between international reserves, broader monetary aggregates, and 
the evolution of world income and prices-will  unavoidably lead us to focus 
on magnitudes other than  international  liquidity narrowly defined. For in- 
stance, if  we are interested in those resources available to finance payments 
imbalances without recourse to domestic adjustment measures, we must focus 
on aggregate broader than international reserves narrowly defined if  capital 
mobility is perfect since, in that case, certain domestic assets are, by assump- 
tion, perfect substitutes for the central bank’s foreign assets. In this instance, 
a focus on a broader concept such as the entire domestic monetary base (since 
we  are concerned with oficial liquidity) would seem more suitable. The ag- 
gregate of the national domestic monetary bases of the countries making up a 
fixed-exchange-rate region in turn becomes a magnitude relevant to the study 
of  what  determines that  region’s overall  monetary  conditions and,  hence, 
plays an important role in influencing the region’s macroeconomic evolution. 
Such considerations have led to proposing the concept of  the world money 
supply (see Day and Heller 1977) as a useful indicator of systemwide mone- 
tary (or liquidity) conditions (Genberg and Swoboda 1977; Heller 1976; Kahn 
1979). On this view, liquidity is thought of more in terms of monetary theory 
generally than in the more narrow sense of  international reserves and the fi- 
nancing of payments imbalances. As we shall see, this change in emphasis 
modifies one’s view of the mechanism of the provision of  liquidity (see sec. 
5.5) and the effects of variations in liquidity (sec. 5.6). 
One main implication of  the preceding arguments is that a definition of 
international liquidity that focuses on “those assets that can be readily used to 
finance payments imbalances” is increasingly difficult to operationalize as for- 
mal and informal cooperation between central banks evolves and as capital 
mobility increases over time. In such circumstances, a statistical approach to 
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for empirical relations between some (controllable) monetary aggregate and a 
target variable such as world nominal income growth or world inflation and 
would base a definition of  liquidity on the stability of these relations in much 
the same way as the money supply is often defined in a national context. 
It should also be evident that a definition of liquidity that is based either on 
the notion of  assets that can be used by  central banks to finance payments 
imbalances or on a statistical association with a variable such as world infla- 
tion (or nominal income) is useful only in the context of a fixed-exchange-rate 
system. For, under freely floating exchange rates, the central bank does not 
need to intervene in the foreign exchange market, and the concepts of world 
inflation and world nominal income lose most of their analytic usefulness.6 
5.2  Contemporary Views about Liquidity Provision: 
The Keynes and the White Plans’ 
The reflections and debate that preceded the presentation of  the Keynes 
(U.K.) and White (U.S.) plans for the postwar international system were in- 
fluenced by the prevailing views about the sources of the interwar monetary 
problems, by expectations as to the nature of future balance-of-payments po- 
sitions, by nation-specific issues, and by the economic doctrines adhered to 
by the two main intellectual architects of the plans, John Maynard Keynes and 
Harry Dexter White. 
A highly influential view of the interwar period was that floating exchange 
rates were inherently unstable owing to the influence of  destabilizing short- 
term capital  flow^.^ Hence, it was taken as given that a new monetary system 
should be  based on essentially fixed exchange rates.9 A  second prevailing 
view was that controls on private capital movements were useful as a stabiliz- 
ing device and could be tolerated in a new international monetary system.  lo 
As a result in part of the consequences of the war, it was generally expected 
that the United States would remain an international creditor for the foresee- 
able future and that Britain would be in a persistent payments deficit position. 
In consequence, the proposals tended to differ with respect to their treatment 
of  the obligations of  surplus and deficit countries in the system. Country- 
specific issues such as the treatment of  the Commonwealth and the accumu- 
6. This does not mean that it is impossible to choose some assets and define their aggregate as 
international liquidity, but it does mean that such a definition does not have any particular analytic 
or policy significance. 
7. The discussion in this section has been influenced by Dam (1982, chaps. 3, 4), Gardner 
(1969, chap. 5), and Horsefield (1969, pt.  1). Documentation concerning the views of contem- 
poraries in the debate can be found in these sources. 
8. Nurkse (1944) is perhaps the best-known example of this view. 
9. Views were not completely parallel, however. Keynes envisaged the use of  exchange-rate 
10. Views differed in degree concerning this issue as well, Keynes being less favorable toward 
changes as an adjustment measure, whereas White did not. 
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lated external liabilities of the United Kingdom (sterling balances) also col- 
ored the recommendations. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that a central feature of  Keynes’s 
view of the role of international monetary arrangements was that they should 
put as few constraints as possible on individual nations’ conduct of domestic 
stabilization policies,  which in the British case would, it was  assumed, be 
expansionary in order to maintain a high level of  employment. The views 
underlying the White plan were closer to the position that domestic policies 
(especially of the expansionary variety) should be constrained by international 
obligations. 
With the above elements in mind, it is easy to explain the main differences 
in the Keynes and the White plans with respect to the way in which the pro- 
vision of  international liquidity was dealt with. Keynes’s plan called for an 
International Currency  (or  Clearing) Union  in  which  imbalances between 
countries would be settled by deficit countries acquiring debit positions with 
the Union  and surplus countries acquiring credit positions. The size of  the 
facility would be equal to the sum of the “quotas” of each member country. 
These quotas would initially be determined as three-quarters of the sum of the 
countries’ exports and imports averaged over the last three prewar years. The 
quotas would subsequently be  adjusted automatically over time according to 
a three-year moving average of the sum of the countries’ most recent exports 
and  imports.  Calculations made  by  Joan  Robinson  (1943) indicated  that 
Keynes’ formula would imply an  initial size of  the Clearing Union of  $26 
billion on the hypothesis that the members would include all United and As- 
sociated Nations. 
Possibilities to draw on the Currency Union were also determined by  the 
member’s quota. Drawings of up to 25 percent were automatic. Further draw- 
ings up to 50 percent carried an interest charge and beyond that, until 75 
percent,  could be  subject to certain conditions imposed by  the Governing 
Board of the Currency Union. 
Credit positions with the Union would be limited not to the quota but in 
theory only by  the sum of  the maximum size of  debit countries’ positions. 
Thus, if  the United States were the only creditor (a possibility that was not 
judged improbable) and all other countries had reached their overdraft limits, 
then the U.S. credit position would be slightly over $17 billion, according to 
the illustrative calculations referred to above.  I’ This figure raised fears in the 
United States that it would become a “milking cow” in the international mon- 
etary system and therefore proved too large for the American negotiators to 
accept. 
The American plan for a Stabilization Fund was,  as the name indicates, 
intended to provide short-term loans to member countries for the purpose of 
11. The U.S. quota would be $3 billion. The other countries’ aggregate quota would then be 
$23 billion, three-quarters of which defined their maximum drawing. 277  The Provision of Liquidity in the Bretton Woods System 
helping them stabilize their exchange rates in the face of temporary balance- 
of-payments difficulties. The resources of  the Fund were made up only of 
paid-in contributions of  the members,  and its total size was  referred to as 
being approximately $5 billion, of  which the U.S.  contribution was some- 
where between $2 and $3 billion.I2 Since it was conceived of as a fund rather 
than an overdraft facility, the maximum credit position of  any one country 
would be limited to its contribution. The maximum size of the drawings was 
equal to 100 percent of the quota during the first year and 150 percent there- 
after.I3 There was no provision for an automatic increase in the size of the 
Stabilization Fund over time, as was the case with the proposal for the Cur- 
rency Union. Such increases had instead to be agreed to by the members rep- 
resenting at least 80 percent of the quotas. 
5.3  International Liquidity in the Articles of Agreement 
The Articles of Agreement that defined the operations of the International 
Monetary Fund  reflected to a significant extent the ideas expressed in the 
White plan for a Stabilization Fund, although compromises and adjustments 
had been made as a result of negotiations leading up to the meetings in Atlan- 
tic City in June 1944 and at Bretton Woods in July of the same year. To under- 
stand the process of  liquidity provision in the Articles, recall that subscrip- 
tions to the Fund were made up of gold (to 25 percent of the quota-the  gold 
tranche)  and  of  domestic  currency  (75  percent  of  the  quota-the  credit 
tranche).I4 A  country  disposed  of  unconditional drawing rights  until  the 
Fund’s holdings of its currency had reached 100 percent of the quota.15  Defin- 
ing international liquidity as national holdings of gold and convertible foreign 
exchange plus unconditional borrowing rights implies that the creation of the 
IMF itself did not increase the measured amount of  liquidity in the system. 
However, the process of drawing on the Fund could lead to some limited (but 
temporary, to the extent that drawings were reimbursed) liquidity creation. 
Suppose that country A purchased the currency of country B to the extent of 
10 percent of country B’s quota. The Fund’s holding of country B’s currency 
would then be only 65 percent of its quota, and country B would be entitled 
12. Horsefield (1969, 43), notes,  however, that,  although the written text of the White plan 
always spoke of a size of “at least $5 billion,” calculations using the proposed formula for deter- 
mining quotas resulted in a total size of the Fund of approximately $10 billion, with a U.S. contri- 
bution of roughly $3 billion. 
13. Maximum drawing rights do not therefore appear to be as different in the two proposals as 
would at first appear. Keynes’s Currency Union was indeed larger, but drawing rights were limited 
to 75 percent of the quota, whereas the White plan envisaged borrowing possibilities of  150 per- 
cent of the quota but with a smaller size of the Fund itself. 
14. The total size of the Fund was originally $8.8 billion and the U.S. quota $2.75 billion (see 
Horsefield, 1969, table 2, p. 96). 
15. In other words, the gold tranche was unconditionally available to the country. It was actually 
not until a decision of the executive directors in 1952 that conditionalify  was defined and that the 
“unconditionality” of the gold tranche was made into Fund policy. 278  Hans Genberg and Alexander K. Swoboda 
to draw unconditionally 35 percent of  its quota. The additional 10 percent 
beyond the gold tranche became known as the super gold tranche, and the sum 
of the measured international liquidity of  the two countries would have  in- 
creased by this amount. 
If  liquidity is measured in the strict sense of  the previous paragraph, the 
only other way in which the Articles of Agreement could accommodate in- 
creases in liquidity was by means of a revaluation of gold in terms of national 
currencies. If  a wider measure is used  that takes into account, albeit in  a 
weighted fashion, the conditional borrowing possibilities at the Fund, then 
the liquidity-creating capacity of the Fund would of course be enhanced. 
The various “facilities” that were added to the Fund’s arsenal of measures 
during the 1960s and 1970s to assist member countries did not increase inter- 
national liquidity in the strict sense, although they presumably allowed some 
countries to pursue policies that were more expansionary (or less contraction- 
ary) than they otherwise would have been. 
As we shall see in the next section, by far the largest source of increases in 
liquidity during the Bretton Woods regime was accounted for by foreign ex- 
change holdings of member countries. To  counter this “uncontrolled” mecha- 
nism of reserve creation, many academic economists and international mone- 
tary  officials called for giving the IMF the capacity to create international 
liquidity by fiat. The special drawing rights (SDRs) that were incorporated in 
the First Amendment to the Articles of Agreements (agreed on in  1968 and 
signed by the member countries in 1969) were the outcome. The first alloca- 
tion of SDRs took place in 1970 to the extent of SDR 3.1 billion, compared 
to a total value of  official reserves of  SDR 93.2 billion.I6 By  the time the 
Bretton Woods system broke down in 1973, the corresponding figures were 
SDR 8.8 billion and SDR 152.4 billion, respectively, hardly a large enough 
proportion to allow us to draw conclusions about the effects of the creation of 
the SDR facility on the performance of  the international monetary system 
under Bretton Woods. 
The Fund’s Articles of Agreement were in fact compatible with a variety of 
possible international standards and their associated ways of providing for the 
growth of  international liquidity. The system could have operated in essence 
as a gold-bullion standard had member countries chosen to decrease, or at 
least not increase, their holdings of foreign exchange reserves and had there 
been no significant increase in Fund quotas or large issue of SDRs; additions 
to international liquidity would then have had to come from new gold produc- 
tion and revaluation of the official price of gold. Alternatively, it could have 
operated (and to some extent it did) as a gold exchange standard where an 
important source of additions to international liquidity would have been addi- 
tions to foreign exchange reserves in various convertible currencies; as long 
16. These figures as well as those quoted in the next sentence are taken from Dam (1982, table 
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as the ratio of gold (and other outside reserves) to foreign exchange holdings 
was kept within “reasonable” limits, such a system could have proved viable. 
Such “reasonable” limits might have constrained liquidity to too low a level, 
however; alternatively, adequate provision of liquidity might imply overshoot- 
ing the limits and creating a confidence problem. This is of course the famed 
Triffin (1960) dilemma. Potentially at least, the provision of international li- 
quidity could have mainly taken the form of increases in Fund quotas and the 
issue of SDRs, thus moving the system increasingly toward a “world central 
bank” model and toward fiat international reserves, whether backed by gold 
or not. Finally, there was little in the Articles of  Agreement to prevent the 
system to evolve, as we will argue it did in the late 1960s and at least at the 
margin, toward a dollar standard where the provision of additional liquidity 
takes (almost) exclusively the form of  accumulation of  dollar holdings by 
non-U.S. monetary authorities. 
That the Bretton Woods system evolved in practice first toward a gold ex- 
change standard and later toward something resembling a pure dollar standard 
is due to a variety of  reasons that are beyond the scope of  this paper.  We 
might, however, mention that the possibility, adopted by the United States, for 
a member to discharge its parity maintenance obligations by freely buying and 
selling gold within prescribed margins facilitated the move toward a gold ex- 
change standard in which various countries stabilized their currencies in terms 
of the dollar while the United States stabilized the dollar price of gold. More- 
over, the fact that the total potential fluctuations of any two non-U.S. curren- 
cies in terms of each other were thus twice as large as that between the dollar 
and other currencies was one reason why foreign exchange reserves took pre- 
dominantly the form of dollars. This was of  course not the only reason: the 
facts that the U.S. dollar was one of the few convertible currencies after the 
Second World War,  that dollar assets enjoyed a relatively broad market, that 
the major part of the stock of monetary gold was in the hands of  the United 
States, and that the Marshall Plan made it possible for the rest of the world to 
accumulate international reserves in spite of the so-called dollar shortage were 
at least as important. 
5.4  The Evolution of International Liquidity: The Principal Facts 
In order to understand how the Bretton Woods system provided for liquidity 
in practice, it is now necessary to turn to some data. For this purpose, we 
define international liquidity as the sum of central bank holdings of  foreign 
exchange, gold, and SDRs plus their position at the IMF, a concept that is 
referred to as total reserves in International Financial Statistics. Figure 5.1 
shows the evolution of this total as well as two subcomponents for the IMF’s 
group of “industrial countries.”  Two facts stand out in this figure-the  literal 
17. The  subcomponents  are “Ih4F position’’  (dashed  line  in  the  figures) and  “IMF posi- 
tion  + SDR holdings  + gold” (solid line [outside reserves]). 280  Hans Genberg and Alexander K. Swoboda 
20 - 
Thoumndr  of $US 
120  I 





-  Total Reserves  ----- IMF Position  -  ’Outside’  reserves 
Fig. 5.1  All industrial countries 
explosion of  total reserves in the last three years of the sample and the pre- 
dominant part played by the foreign exchange component of total reserves not 
only in these final years but during the entire sample period.l* We  shall argue 
below that both these facts are critically important for understanding the func- 
tioning of the Bretton Woods system as well as its breakdown. 
If  changes in the total value of international reserves are influenced primar- 
ily by its foreign exchange component, the same is not true if the determinants 
of the reserves of the United States and of the rest of the industrialized coun- 
tries are taken separately. Figures 5.2 and 5.3  contain the relevant data series. 
They indicate that redistribution of reserves between regions took place not 
only through changes in foreign exchange holdings but also to a large extent 
through variations in the other components of international reserves.  l9  Ideally, 
one would want to complement the data presented in figures 5.1-5.3  with data 
concerning the breakdown of the foreign exchange component of  international 
reserves into dollars and other currencies, on the one hand, and also to obtain 
18. Correlation coefficients between, on the one hand, annual changes in total reserves, and, on 
the other, changes in foreign exchange holdings, in holdings of gold and SDRs, and in the reserve 
position vis-A-vis the IMF (excluding SDRs) are .99, .13, and -  .49, respectively, for the 1951- 
71 sample. For the 1951-69  sample, the corresponding correlation coefficients are .60, .29, and 
.06, respectively. 
19. For example, although the correlation coefficient between annual changes in total reserves 
and the subcomponent “foreign exchange” for the rest-of-the-world (non-US.) group of indus- 
trialized countries is .98 for the period 1951-71,  it falls to SO  for the period 1951-69.  The corre- 
sponding correlation coefficients between changes in “total reserves” and changes in “holdings of 
gold and SDRs” for the same group of countries are SO  and .80, respectively. 281  The Provision of Liquidity in the Bretton Woods System 
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data on the share of Euro-currency deposits in the total holdings of  foreign 
exchange assets of central banks, on the other. Reliable data on these break- 
downs are unfortunately not readily available. There are reliable indications, 
however, that the share of dollar assets in total foreign exchange reserves was 
predominant (apart  from’ the  sterling area  and  CFA  [Colonies FranGaises 
d’  Afrique] holdings of sterling and French francs) throughout the period and 
that  it  did  not  decline  significantly. There  are also indications that  Euro- 
currency deposits of  most central banks remained modest at least for G10 
countries, where an agreement was reached to limit their scope. 
The data presented in figures 5.1-5.3  raise a number of questions concern- 
ing the provision of liquidity in the Bretton Woods system: 
To what extent is the evolution of  total reserves in the system beyond the 
control of institutions like the IMF? 
To  what extent is the reserve position of  the non-U.S. group of  countries 
(and therefore the balance of payments of the United States) determined by 
their demand for reserves or by the supply of reserves of the United States? 
Is the provision of reserves excessive, insufficient, or adequate? 
These questions are taken up in subsequent sections of this paper, occasionally 
in terms of the traditional literature on the Bretton Woods system, but mainly 
in terms of an interpretation that emphasizes the relations between the data in 
figures 5.1-5.3,  the evolution of prices and economic activity in the system, 
and the conduct of monetary policy in the United States and in the rest of the 
countries. This suggests that data concerning the evolution of  inflation and 
monetary policy during the period in which the Bretton Woods regime was in 
operation are relevant to questions concerning the “adequacy” of  the supply 
of international reserves. 
That such data are not much emphasized in the traditional analysis of  the 
adequacy of  international liquidity is partly due to that question being dis- 
cussed mainly within the framework of  the demand for reserves literature. 
Much of that literature was intended to shed light on the question of whether 
the level of international liquidity actually supplied in the Bretton Woods sys- 
tem was “adequate.” It did not, however, always provide a satisfactory answer 
because, by focusing only on the demand for reserves, it did not specify how 
authorities would behave if they were not on their demand curve. It was often 
assumed implicitly that insufficient reserves would lead to the imposition of 
controls on international trade or the pursuit of  excessively contractionary 
economic policies,  leading in both cases to recession and  unemployment. 
This suggests looking for signs of  such policies and trying to relate them to 
the international reserve position of the country. The obvious difficulty with 
this approach is that policy is influenced by many factors, and it may therefore 
be difficult to isolate the effect of reserve shortages. In addition, the traditional 
analysis is often based on an individual country approach to the demand for 
reserves, which  does not always translate easily into examining the  “ade- 
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An alternative means of discussing the adequacy of reserves is to recognize 
the monetary nature of these assets and argue that changes in the world stock 
of  international reserves will in the medium term be related to the evolution 
of monetary policy in the constituent countries and to the world price level. 
According to this view,  the rate of  growth of  international reserves may be 
considered adequate if  it results in a rate of  world inflation that is desirable. 
Figure 5.4 contains some data that are relevant for judging the adequacy of 
the provision of reserves under Bretton Woods using this criterion. Three as- 
pects of this figure are worth highlighting. First, abstracting from the episode 
in the early 1950s associated with the commodity-price boom at the time of 
the Korean War,  there is a relatively steady increase in the rate of  inflation 
during the sample period, especially in the 1960s. Second, this increase in the 
rate of  inflation is associated with an equally steady increase in the average 
rate of  growth of  money in the world that is suggestive of  a causal relation 
between these variables.20  Third, the rate of growth of international reserves 
does not exhibit the same steady increase as the other two variables, although 
the very rapid growth at the very end of  the sample does coincide with rapid 
growth rates of the other variables as well. 
The two subsequent sections will discuss some theoretical models and em- 
pirical studies that have attempted to explain these relations. 
5.5  The Evolution of International Liquidity: The Mechanisms 
This section seeks to provide an integrated explanation of three features of 
the Bretton Woods system, as it actually operated, that were emphasized in 
the previous section: first, the dominant role of the foreign exchange (mainly 
U.S. dollar) component of international reserves in the evolution of total in- 
ternational reserves; second, the mechanism by  which total international re- 
serves are distributed between the United States and the rest of the industrial- 
ized  world; third,  the connection between the creation and distribution of 
international liquidity thus narrowly defined, national monetary policies and 
money stocks, and the broader aggregate that we have called the world money 
stock. In addition, our explanation will outline the connection between these 
monetary magnitudes and income and prices. 
The explanation that we offer in this section is based on a modified “global 
monetarist” view of the reserve creation and distribution mechanism. The pre- 
sentation will be kept relatively brief  and intuitive as we have developed it 
more fully and formally elsewhere.21 
The basic point of the analysis is to recognize that strictly fixed exchange 
rates imply that, for certain purposes, the “fixed-exchange-rate world” is an 
20. We are referring here to the medium-term trend rates of growth of both variables, which are 
clearly increasing throughout the sample. Questions relating to the short-term relation between 
the two variables will be discussed in sec. 5.6.1 below. 
21. See, in particular, Genberg and Swoboda (1977a, 1981) and Swoboda (1978). Swoboda 
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appropriate unit of analysis. For that “world,” it is appropriate to think of the 
determination of  monetary variables such as “world” money income, infla- 
tion, nominal interest rates, and so forth in terms of the evolution of “world” 
monetary aggregates such as the world money supply, monetary base, or sup- 
ply of international reserves. This does not mean that national (or “regional”) 
issues are unimportant, however. But what needs to be explained is both (and 
simultaneously) the evolution of world magnitudes and deviations of national 
inflation, interest rates, and income growth from the common average. In that 
perspective, balance-of-payments disequilibria are viewed as distributional is- 
sues where it is the payments adjustment mechanism that moves actual inter- 
national reserves toward their equilibrium distribution. The basic principles 
governing such a world are most easily stated in terms of long-run equilibrium 
relations. But these long-run relations are likely to be established relatively 
quickly in chronological time when goods and capital markets are closely in- 
tegrated. 
More specifically, it is goods arbitrage, reinforced by changes in aggregate 
spending brought about by reserve flows, that will ensure in the medium run 
a high degree of  convergence in national inflation rates. This means not that 
there will be no observed difference in national inflation rates but that there 
will be a strong common trend in these rates. Observed deviations from the 
common trend would then reflect one or several of the following four factors: 
nominal exchange rates that are not strictly fixed (occasional changes in parity 
and movements within intervention margins); statistical discrepancies in the 
collection and construction of  price indices across countries (so-called errors 
of  measurement); changes in equilibrium real exchange rates (so-called real 285  The Provision of Liquidity in the Bretton Woods System 
disturbances); and temporary disequilibrium changes in real exchange rates 
due to divergent macroeconomic (especially monetary) policies eventually in- 
consistent with the maintenance of a fixed parity. The common trend in infla- 
tion rates,  the world rate of  inflation for short, then,  is determined by  the 
evolution of  the world money stock relative to output, in  analogy with the 
determination of the national rate of inflation (or of the rate of growth of nom- 
inal national income) by the trend rate of growth of the national money stock 
in a closed economy. Determination of the world money stock, however, is a 
somewhat more complex affair than determination of a national money stock, 
as we shall argue shortly. 
There is evidence (some of  which is reviewed in subsequent sections) that 
the industrialized countries’ economies were sufficiently integrated between 
1959 and 1971 for this view to have a great deal of short-run relevance and for 
it to make sense to speak of a world rate of inflation, the evolution of which 
was broadly governed by that of the world money stock, defined as the aggre- 
gate of national money stocks converted into the same currency at the prevail- 
ing parities. Between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods 
system functioned like a monetary union. Parity changes were relatively few, 
inflation rates converged to the world average, monetary disequilibria were 
rapidly resorbed by changes in the world average rate of inflation and by inter- 
national reserve flows (the counterpart of  payments deficits and surpluses), 
and goods and capital markets became closely integrated. Capital flowed not 
in response to the irrational whims of speculators but in economically correct 
response to the incentives provided by  the trends in the national macroeco- 
nomic, and more specifically monetary, policies of the times. 
The simultaneous determination of  the world  money stock, the world’s 
stock of  international reserves, and the distribution of  the latter through the 
payments  adjustment mechanism therefore deserves particular attention. It 
turns out that the specific institutional arrangements of  the prevailing fixed- 
exchange-rate system,  most notably  international reserve holding patterns, 
play a crucial role in that simultaneous determination. 
Roughly spealung, one can think of the world money stock as the product 
of  a money multiplier times a monetary base consisting of  the sum of  the 
domestic components of  national monetary bases plus the total of  interna- 
tional reserves available in our fixed-exchange-rate world. Things are rela- 
tively simple if  these international reserves are “outside” reserves (nobody’s 
liability) such as gold or SDRs that are fixed in quantity or at least whose 
growth does not depend on national monetary policies.22  Consider, for in- 
22. A more complete analysis would clearly distinguish two types of outside reserve systems: 
commodity and fiat international reserves. The supply of the former reacts to changes in the real 
value of the commodity and thus provides an  automatic stabilizer to the world price level, pro- 
vided the marginal cost function of producing the commodity is rising and stable. Fiat interna- 
tional reserves do not fulfill this automatic stabilization function, but their supply has the advan- 
tage of not being subject to productivity shocks. They have a further advantage in allowing for 
seigniorage gains. Much of the remainder of sec. 5.5 is reproduced from Swoboda (1991). 286  Hans Genberg and Alexander K. Swoboda 
stance, a system in which gold is the only international reserve asset but in 
which national monetary authorities need not keep a strict proportionality be- 
tween their gold reserves and their domestic assets. Divide that world into two 
countries or regions, the United States and Europe. Imagine that the United 
States decides to increase its money supply by  an open-market purchase of 
bonds. This results, at first, in an increase in the U.S. money stock equal to 
the increase in the monetary base times the U.S. money multiplier. But it also 
creates an excess supply of U.S. dollars, which tends to depreciate that cur- 
rency on the foreign exchange market and, when the gold points have been 
reached, results in an outflow of gold from the United States toward Europe. 
This reduces the initial increase in the U.S. money supply and increases the 
European money supply by the inflow of gold into Europe times the European 
money multiplier. The process will continue until the initial equilibrium dis- 
tribution of  the world money stock into its U.S. and European components 
has been reestablished. In the end, the world money stock will have increased 
by the amount of  the initial increase in the domestic component of  the U.S. 
monetary base times the world money multiplier, itself a weighted average of 
the two regional money multipliers; at the same time, the gold stock of  the 
United States will have decreased and that of  Europe increased by the same 
amount; and the increase in the world money stock will have resulted in an 
increase in  world  money  income sufficient to  resorb the  initial excess of 
money in the world created by the monetary expansion. One remarkable fea- 
ture of  this scenario is its symmetry: had it been Europe that had made an 
initial open-market purchase of bonds of the same size as that of the United 
States, the end result in terms of the world money stock and price level would 
have been exactly the same; the only difference would have been that Europe 
would have lost, and the United States gained, gold. 
This symmetry and simplicity is lost when international reserve assets are 
composed, at least partly, of  “inside” assets, that is, of  national currencies. 
Consider the polar case of a dollar standard where Europe’s central bank holds 
U.S. Treasury bills as a reserve asset. Consider, first, the effects of an open- 
market purchase by the Fed. As before, this results in an initial multiple in- 
crease in the U.S.  money stock, an excess supply of dollars, and a U.S. pay- 
ments deficit. As the European monetary authorities intervene to prevent the 
appreciation of the ecu beyond the intervention margin around parity, the lat- 
ter translates not into a loss of gold for the United States and a gain for Europe 
but only into an increase in the U.S. Treasury bills held by  Europe’s central 
bank, whose money stock witnesses a multiple expansion as a consequence. 
The end result is therefore an increase in the world money stock of  greater 
magnitude than that which occurs under the gold standard since there are no 
international reserve losses by  the United States to moderate the increase in 
the U.S.  money stock. The European money stock bears, as it were, all the 
burden  of  adjusting to the initial increase in the U.S.  monetary base. The 
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and the increase in world nominal income will be similarly magnified. Will 
the power of European monetary policy also be magnified under a dollar stan- 
dard? The answer is a resounding no. To  see this, consider an expansionary 
monetary policy in Europe. The initial effect is similar to the gold standard 
case: an increase in the supply of, say, ecus and a payments deficit for Europe. 
The consequence of  that payments deficit is now  simply a reduction in the 
U.S. Treasury bills held by Europe but with no effect on the U.S. monetary 
base  and money  supply.  Europe’s payments deficit will last as long  as its 
money supply has not returned to its initial level and with it the world money 
stock and price level. All that will have changed in the end (which admittedly 
may come only after a while) is the composition of  the European monetary 
base: the European central bank’s holdings of U.S. Treasury bills will have 
declined by an amount equal to the increase in its holdings of domestic bonds. 
Under a dollar standard, then, European monetary policy is robbed of any 
long-run effectiveness, whereas U. S . monetary policy becomes singularly ef- 
fective. These conclusions, in their extreme version at least, are based on a 
number of  restrictive assumptions, such as perfect substitutability between 
European and U.S. bonds, and hold only for the long run. But the qualitative 
results regarding the strong asymmetries that arise in an inside reserve system 
are very robust. Our argument is that the way  in which the Bretton Woods 
regime actually functioned, especially in the latter part of the 1960s and in the 
early 1970s, closely resembles the hypothetical dollar standard that we have 
just sketched. Before we buttress that argument by empirical evidence in the 
next section, we illustrate it briefly diagramrnati~ally.~~ 
Figure 5.5 relates national money stocks in the United States (Mus)  and the 
rest of  the world (M*) to the world money stock (MW),  which is the sum of 
the two national money stocks converted into a single currency unit at the 
prevailing parity. The lines M;,  MI,  My,  represent increasingly larger world 
money stocks; by an appropriate choice of units (exchange rate equal to one), 
the slope of  these lines will be  minus one. The points on a given MW line 
represent all the possible distributions of the given world money stock among 
the two regions. Only one such distribution, however, is compatible with of- 
ficial settlements balance-of-payments equilibrium since the latter requires, in 
the absence of  real  shocks, that  the two national money  stocks stand in  a 
specific relation (ratio) to each other.  Suppose that  a balance-of-payments 
equilibrium is attained along line OF? Assume an initial equilibrium at A. 
Consider, first, the outside reserve case. An open-market operation in the 
rest of the world that increases the money stock there from Mt to Mi initially 
(before other adjustments) moves the system to B. But, given initial values of 
all other variables, there is now an excess supply both of money in the world 
as a whole and of  rest-of-world (ROW) currency relative to U.S. currency. 
23. A similar illustration and more detailed explanation can be  found in Genberg and Swoboda 
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Fig. 5.5  The determination of the world money stock under alternative 
monetary standards 
There is, in other words, both an excess demand for goods, which tends to 
raise world nominal income, and a ROW payments deficit. To  the latter cor- 
responds a redistribution of  outside (say, gold) reserves from the rest of  the 
world to the United States and a corresponding redistribution of  the world 
money stock moving the system from B to C along My’.  Final equilibrium will 
be  at C.  The symmetry of  the system can be illustrated by  considering an 
equivalent increase in the world money stock brought about by an increase in 
the U.S. money supply from M;;s to My.  At D, we now have an excess supply 
of U.S. dollars, and redistribution of reserves and money stocks again brings 
the system to rest at C. 
Consider now an inside reserve system. Assume, for simplicity, an  extreme 
version of  the latter: a dollar standard where the U.S. monetary authorities do 
not allow international  developments to affect the U.S. money stock (or where 
the rest of  the world holds only U.S. Treasury bills as reserves). That regime 
sharply alters the effectiveness of monetary policy in the two regions. As be- 
fore, an expansion of the ROW money stock to M; would initially bring the 
system to point B. Again, there is a ROW deficit, but this does not result in a 
redistribution of  the world money stock and an increase in the U.S.  money 
stock. The “only” thing that happens is a loss of  reserves by the rest of  the 
world; this will go on until the ROW money stock is reduced to its initial level 
at A and the payments disequilibrium is eliminated. In full equilibrium, then, 289  The Provision of  Liquidity in the Bretton Woods System 
monetary policy in the rest of the world is completely robbed of its effective- 
ness. In sharp contrast, the effectiveness of U.S. monetary policy is magnified 
under a dollar standard. An  increase in the U.S.  money stock to My again 
initially brings the system to D, but now the U.S. deficit and the ROW surplus 
result only in an increase in the ROW money stock. The final equilibrium is 
at E rather than C,  and the world money stock increases to My rather than only 
to My. 
5.6  International Liquidity, Money, and Inflation 
The surge of  inflation in the late 1960s and the early 1970s that became 
recognized as a worldwide phenomenon gave rise to a number of studies that 
attempted to look at a relation between this acceleration of inflation, its inter- 
national character, and the growth of international liquidity and money. Most 
of  these studies assumed that the observed growth of  international reserves 
was exogenous and proceeded to test for effects of the growth of these reserves 
on worldwide inflation. In this section, we first briefly review the main con- 
clusions that emerged from these studies. We  then present some results of  a 
model in which both the worldwide inflation rate and the distribution of  re- 
serves between the United States and the rest of the industrialized countries 
are endogenous. 
5.6.1 
Heller (1976) is an example of  a number of  studies that appeared in the 
mid-1970s and that focused on the international  aspect of inflation, attempting 
to explain it by some measure of global monetary expan~ion.~~  Using average 
annual data for 127 countries and for the period 1955-74,  Heller found statis- 
tically significant relations between the growth of international reserves and 
the growth of money, on the one hand, and between the growth of money and 
the aggregate inflation rate, on the other. In both cases, the best results were 
obtained when lagged effects were allowed for, with money growth lagging 
behind reserve growth by about one year and inflation lagging behind money 
by approximately two years.25  Heller treated the growth rate of international 
reserves as exogenous in the regression equation. Subsequent studies used 
tests proposed by  Sims and Granger to test the “causality” patterns between 
these variables. On the basis of  such tests, Genberg and Swoboda (1977a) 
concluded that movements in world monetary aggregates caused movements 
in world nominal income and the world price level. Kahn (1979), using quar- 
terly  data and  distinguishing between industrial and  developing countries, 
A Brief Look at the Literature 
24.  Other studies include Genberg and  Swoboda (1977a), Meiselman (1975), and  Parkin 
25. A regression of  inflation directly on the growth of  international reserves also showed a 
(  1977). 
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also concluded that the growth of international reserves was the causal factor 
in the reserves-inflation relation, especially for the industrial countries and the 
According to these and a number of similar studies, the growth of liquidity 
(international reserves) was an important factor in the accelerating inflation of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The studies were, however, largely silent on 
the underlying reasons for the growth of  international liquidity. As we have 
seen in section 5.4 above, this growth was dominated by movements in for- 
eign exchange reserves, which in turn were not the result of a decision of any 
monetary authority in particular but rather the outcome of  an interaction be- 
tween the monetary policies followed in the United States, on the one hand, 
and those followed in the rest of  the Bretton Woods world, on the other, as 
explained in the previous section. A fuller understanding of  the process of 
reserve growth and inflation and its relation to monetary policies thus requires 
an integrated explanation that combines the arguments and empirical evidence 
put forward in the previous section with the kind of regression results obtained 
by Heller and others. We now turn to a modest attempt at such an explanation. 
5.6.2  A Model of the Growth of International Reserves, of Their 
Distribution, and of Worldwide Inflation 
period 1957-72. 
The model that we propose as an explanation of both the evolution of inter- 
national reserves and the medium- to long-term inflation rate in the Bretton 
Woods system combines an analysis of and evidence of the world money sup- 
ply process with the statistical relation between inflation and the world money 
supply. As will become apparent shortly, it is a quite simplified model, and we 
certainly do not consider it as providing a complete explanation of  the phe- 
nomena we are interested in. The intention is to see whether it can capture the 
main features of  the data presented in figures 5.1-5.4.  The model can be 
thought of as a dynamic version of that illustrated in figure 5.5. 
The model contains money demand ([l] and [2]) and money supply ([3] 
and [4]) equations for two regions (the United States and the rest of the G10 
countries, respectively, in the empirical application) and adjustment equations 
([5] and [6]) that explain, respectively, the growth rate of nominal income in 
the G10 world and the growth of international reserves in the system? 
MP  = MoP:y:eEiv 
26. The model is very similar to that specified and estimated in Genberg and Swoboda (1977b), 
although the country coverage in the empirical application and also the estimation technique are 
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i=  I 
where Md = money demand, M = actual quantity of money, P = price level, 
y  = real income, m = money supply multiplier, B  = monetary base, A  = 
domestic source component of  the monetary base, and R  = international re- 
serves. 
The money demand equations are conventi~nal.~~  The specification of  the 
money supply relations imposes a long-run version of  the asymmetry view 
according to which  the monetary base in  the United States is immune to 
changes in international reserves in the other countries be it because the Fed- 
eral Reserve sterilizes the effects of such changes or because the other coun- 
tries do so in its place.28  Notice, however, that, in view of the fact that redis- 
tribution of reserves is not assumed to be instantaneous (see the discussion of 
eq. [6] below), we allow for short-run effects of monetary policy in the non- 
U.S. countries on the world money stock and hence on world inflation. 
Equation (5) describes the growth of world nominal income in a fairly com- 
monplace monetarist manner. The current growth rate is assumed to depend 
partly on a distributed lag of the growth of the world money supply and partly 
on excess holdings of money measured by the discrepancy between the out- 
standing and the desired stock of money in the 
The specification of  the non-U.  S. countries’ balance-of-payments surplus 
or deficit implicit in (6) is a shorthand way of catching the combined effects 
of the multitude of  factors that affect the trade, service, and capital accounts 
in the international transactions between the two regions. The rate of change 
in the stock of  international reserves held by  non-U.S. central banks is ex- 
plained by a simple partial adjustment mechanism that depends on the differ- 
27. A superscript w refers to the entire world (GI0 countries), an asterisk indicates the nine 
non-U.S. countries, and variables without a superscript pertain to the United States. 
28. This assumption is justified by the empirical evidence presented in Genberg and Swoboda 
(1981).  There we estimated reduced-form equations for the evolution of the money stock in a 
group of fourteen industrial countries including the United States and for the money stock of the 
thirteen non-U.S. countries in that sample. The explanatory variables were, inter alia, the domes- 
tic source components in the two regions,  what we here call A.  The empirical results indicated 
strongly the presence of asymmetries between the effects of  monetary policies originating in the 
United States and similar policies originating in the other countries. The effects of changes in 
relative income levels and in the evolution of “outside” reserves likewise pointed to assymmetries. 
While the methodology we used in that study did not allow us  to test explicitly for complete long- 
run offsets of non-U.S.  monetary policy, the strong short-run asymmetries suggest that the speci- 
fication we adopt here may be justified. Giovannini (1988) compares the gold standard of  1870- 
1913, the Bretton Woods system, and the European Monetary System and argues that the first and 
the third exhibit a greater degree of  asymmetry than the second. 
29. Implicit in this specification is the recognition that changes in the rate of money growth may 
have a short-run influence on output and employment. We believe that the long-run effect is pri- 
marily on the inflation rate, however. 292  Hans Genberg and Alexander K. Swoboda 
ence between the long-run equilibrium level of this stock. R*  (defined, as it 
were, by the intersection of OP and M; in fig.  5.5), and last period’s actual 
level. R* is in turn determined by the requirement that, in the long run, the 
distribution of the supply of money in the world economy must correspond to 
the distribution of demand, that is, 
(7) 
Md 
Md + M*d’ 
-  -  M 
M  + M* 
To  illustrate the workings of the model, and, in the spirit of section 5.5, to 
show  the difference  between  monetary  policies  originating  in  the  United 
States, on the one hand, and those originating in the rest of the G10, on the 
other, consider the effects of and increase in B and in A*. The initial response 
in both cases is for world nominal income to start increasing. Equation (7), 
however, implies that an expansionary policy in the United States increases 
the equilibrium level of reserves in the rest of the world, whereas a similar 
policy there reduces it as the equilibrium distribution of the supply of money 
is reestablished. The secondary effect of  the U.S.  monetary expansion thus 
reinforces its effect. The increase in A*, on the other hand, is neutralized by a 
fall in R*  until ultimately the supply of money inside as well as outside the 
United States is back at its original level, as is nominal income in the world. 
The length of time that this process takes to work itself out depends crucially 
on the parameter a,  in equation (6).  The values of y, and y2  will at the same 
time determine the movements in world nominal income. 
5.6.3  Estimation Results 
To  see whether the simple model described by equations (1)-(7)  is capable 
of explaining the main features of inflation and international reserve move- 
ments  during  the  Bretton  Woods era, we  estimated  the parameters  in  the 
money demand functions and the reduced-form income growth and reserve 
flow equations with quarterly data taken from International Financial Statis- 
tics for the G10 countries and the period  1959:l-1971:4.  The measure of ex- 
cess money  supply necessary  for the income growth equation was the esti- 
mated residual in the equation 
(8)  In My = In (Mt + M,*d) + u,. 
Log-linearizing the right-hand side around the sample averages of the money 
stocks and using the demand equations (1) and (2) gives an equation that can 
be written30 
M 
In  (-);  = co + q In  (yy) + (1 -  sus) 
(9)  P 
(q* - q)ln yt + [WE  - (1 -  sus)~*]i; + u, 
30. The constant sus = .59 is defined to be the share of  the U.S. money supply in the G10  total 
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Ordinary least squares estimation applied to this equation produced esti- 
mates of  q and q*  equal to .89 and  1.42 with t-values of  8.49 and  13.94, 
respectively. The weighted average of the interest semielasticities was esti- 
mated to be -  .023 with a t-value-of 5.95. The estimated values of  u, were 
used as the measure of  the excess supply of  money in the estimation of the 
parameters in equation (5). The results were3' 
Yl.0  Y1.1  Yl.2  YI.3  Sum 
Estimate  .10  .27  -  .28  .09 





Y2.1  72.2  72.3  72.4  Sum 
.25  .I1  .40  .04  .81 
1.86  .73  2.86  .03  3.69 
Estimate 
t-value 
Y3.l  Y3.2 
1.04  -  .44 
7.30  -3.52 
R2 = .80, D-W = 1.92 
Judged by the R'  and the Durbin-Watson statistic, the results are satisfac- 
tory. The sum of  the estimated adjustment parameters as well as their implied 
lag patterns are consistent with previous estimates of the effects of  the world 
money supply on world inflation. 
In order to estimate the reserve flow equation (6),  the long-run equilibrium 
condition (7) was first used to express the equilibrium level of  non-U.S. re- 
serves in terms ofy, y*, M,  m*,  andA* as in (10): 
rl*  rl  1 
SR*  SR.  SR*  + -  In  y,* - -  Iny, + -(E  - ~*)i:. 
rl*  rl  1  +  In  y,* - ;  Iny, + ;(E  - ~*)i:. 
3R*  JR'  3R' 
Substituting this relation into (6) and estimating the unknown parameters by 
ordinary least squares gave the following results:32 
31. Since we do not have an equation that splits the growth of world nominal income into its 
price and output components, we make the simplifying assumption that real output is exogenous 
in our system. This makes the model recursive so that it can be estimated with the ordinary least 
squares technique. If changes in money growth also affect real income in the short run, then qq. 
(5)  and (6) would have to be estimated jointly, unless the income elasticities of the demand for 
money were the same in both regions, a condition that does not seem to be fulfilled, according to 
our estimates. 
32. 'hllio (1979) estimates an equation for the U.S.  official settlements balance that is similar 
in  spirit to our equation.  He also finds empirical  support for a monetary intelpretation of  the 
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a1  T  T*  (E -  E*)/S,. 
Estimate  .24  1.22  I .72  -  .01 
r-value  3.24  4.80  5.55  -  .36 
R, = .44,  D-W = 1.46 
It is interesting to note that the estimates of  the income elasticities of  de- 
mand for money obtained in this equation are not significantly different by the 
usual statistical criteria from those obtained directly from the estimation of 
(9), a result that instills some confidence in the model. The estimate of  a, 
implies an “offset coefficient”  of .24 within the quarter and, if real output were 
assumed to be independent of the money supply, an offset in one year of  .67. 
This rather rapid  adjustment process is  presumably the basic reason why 
movements in interest rates, prices, and economic activity were very similar 
in the countries included in our sample and why analysis of the determination 
of these variables should be conducted at the global level rather than country 
by country. 
The values of the estimated parameters accord well with the interpretation 
we give to them in terms of  the theoretical model. This constitutes one ele- 
ment of empirical evidence in favor of our proposed view of how the Bretton 
Woods system functioned. The RZ  statistics also suggest that the model fits the 
data reasonably well. However, these statistics would give an exaggerated im- 
pression of  the model’s ability to track the data when  lagged values of  the 
dependent variable are used as explanatory variables. To  facilitate an evalua- 
tion of  the model’s performance, we  therefore used it to generate dynamic 
forecasts for the sample period studied. Figures 5.6-5.8  contain the actual 
values and the dynamic forecasts of the level of  world nominal income, the 
world price level, and the international  reserve holdings of the non-U.S. coun- 
tries.33  The general impression that these figures convey is that the model 
tracks the data reasonably well. As expected, short-run movements are not 
well explained, but the general patterns are captured. For nominal income and 
the price level, this may partly be because of the illusion given by the trend 
increase in these series, but it should be noted that the model does pick up the 
slight fall in the growth of nominal income that occurred in the second half of 
1966 and early 1967 and the subsequent acceleration. The period of  slower 
growth starting in the second half of  1969 is also visible in the model’s fore- 
cast. Figure 5.7 also reveals that the general acceleration of  the world price 
level is picked up by the model. 
For our purposes, the most satisfying feature of  these figures is the ability 
of  the model to capture the salient features of  the evolution of  international 
reserves during this period not only because this is the main focus of the paper 
33. In generating the forecasts for the price level, it is assumed that real output is exogenous. 295  The Provision of  Liquidity in the Bretton Woods System 
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Fig. 5.8  International reserves outside the United States 
but also because it is less dominated by a steady time trend than the other two 
variables. 
In order to gain additional insights into the respective roles of  money de- 
mand factors and money supply factors for the evolution of international re- 
serves, it turns out to be instructive to reestimate the model for a period not 
including the last three years of the sample utilized so far and to perform out- 
of-sample  simulation^.^^ The estimation results using data until 1968:4 do not 
change the results very much as far as the equations for world money demand 
and world nominal income growth are concerned. In  particular, the income 
elasticities in the money demand equations turn out not to be significantly 
different from those obtained for the full sample, and the variable capturing 
excess money supply continues to be a significant (at the 5 percent level) fac- 
tor explaining nominal income  The latter result is particularly note- 
worthy  in  view  of  suggestions that  the  empirical link between  monetary 
growth and world inflation during the Bretton Woods system is due only to the 
period 1970-72,  a claim made by Rabin and Pratt (1981) in their comment on 
Heller (1976). Our results show the contrary, that excess money growth had 
an important influence on world inflation well before that. 
34. Such simulations were suggested by M. Obstfeld and the editors of the volume. 
35.  The growth rate of the world money supply also continues to have a positive influence on 
the growth rate of world nominal income, but the corresponding coefficient estimates are impre- 
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Using the shorter sample changes the estimates of the reserve flow equation 
(6) in two important respects: the point estimate of the parameter (Y measuring 
the speed of adjustment falls to .13 from .24, and the parameters associated 
with the real income variables are very low and estimated very impre~isely.~~ 
A plausible explanation of the first of these changes is in our view to be found 
in an increase in the degree of  capital mobility toward the end of  the 1960s. 
As we  shall see presently, this explanation is consistent with the simulation 
results obtained for the period 1969-71. 
A potential reason for the imprecise estimates of the effects of real income 
on reserve flows for the period 1960-68  can be gleaned from the solid line 
(dubbed demand pressure) in  figure 5.9, which shows the evolution of  the 
ratio of  real income in the “rest of  the world” to real income in the United 
States.37  It is possible that the relatively modest variation in this variable dur- 
ing the period 1960-68 makes it difficult  to isolate its importance by regres- 
sion methods.  If  this explanation is correct, the sharp upswing starting in 
1967 and  lasting until the end of  the sample provides enough variability to 
sharpen the coefficient estimates. 
Figure 5.9 allows us to discuss the so-called demand versus supply expla- 
nations of the balance-of-payments deficit of the United States, which, as we 
have seen, for all practical purposes can be equated with reserve accumulation 
by  the other countries we are concerned with. A relative increase in the real 
income of the United States (a reduction in the variable labeled demandpres- 
sure) increases the relative demand for dollars and tends to reduce the balance- 
of-payments deficit of the United States. The variable labeled supply pressure 
measures the evolution of the supply of dollars relative to the home-produced 
(i.e., as a result of “domestic credit” and multiplier changes) supply of other 
monies in the system. An  increase in this variable would tend to lead to a 
deficit in the U.S. balance of  payments and to an increase in  international 
reserves elsewhere. We  note that, from the beginning of  the 1960s until the 
end of  1967, neither the supply nor the demand side generated any significant 
pressure on reserve outflows from the United States. Money supply influences 
ran if  anything in the opposite direction, whereas a higher income elasticity 
of demand for money outside the United States compensated for the somewhat 
lower real growth to cause the relatively flat path of international reserves that 
was shown in figure 5.8. This picture starts to change in  1967. The relative 
real growth performance of the United States deteriorates, and an outflow of 
reserves is prevented only by a continuing relative restraint on the side of the 
supply of  money. This lasts until 1969, when all factors work in conjunction 
36. The implied value of q*  is 35,  but its standard error is so large that this estimate is not 
significantly different from the elasticity 1.42 deduced directly from the estimate in the  money 
demand function. The implied point estimate of q,  on the other hand, is negative, but with a r- 
value less than one. 
37. Both variables in the figures are normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. 298  Hans Genberg and Alexander K. Swoboda 
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Fig. 5.9  Demand and supply pressures on reserves 
to generate a balance-of-payments deficit for the United States: real growth is 
lower in  the United States,  the income elasticity of  demand for money is 
higher abroad, and U.S. monetary policy is becoming relatively more expan- 
sionary. It is not surprising, at least according to the model that we are propos- 
ing, that international reserves in the system practically explode during 1970 
and 1971. We  shall return to the relation between the evolution just described 
and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in section 5.7 below. 
Before doing so, we present two sets of dynamic simulations of the model 
based on estimates calculated using data until the end of 1968. The first, figure 
5.10, shows the combined effects of the low income coefficients and the low 
speed of adjustment found in the estimates of equation (6). Clearly, the model 
is underpredicting the reserve evolution in the rest of the world toward the end 
of the sample even though the effect of the expansionary effects coming from 
the money supply side are visible during the last two years. Figure 5.1  1 im- 
poses the income elasticities obtained in the estimates of the money demand 
equation for the full sample period on the system but retains the low speed of 
adjustment estimated for the shorter sample. The overall fit is substantially 
improved, and the main difference between this simulation and that shown in 
figure 5.7 above is now only the lag of the predicted reserve adjustments in 
the period 1969-71.  As we have already suggested, an increase in the degree 
of capital mobility toward the end of the sample can explain why actual re- 
serve flows responded more rapidly during the end of the Bretton Woods years 




3.5  - 
3.3 - 
3.1 - 







2.9  11  I  11  11  I I  I  11  I  III  11  II  111  I  I  11  I  111  I  11  11  I  11  11  I  11 
61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71 
Actual  -  Forecast  - 
Fig. 5.10  International reserves outside the United States 
Log of  8 US million 
2.9 ‘I I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  11  I  11  III  I  11  I  11  I  I  I  I  II  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  11  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71 
Actual  -  Forecast  - 
Fig. 5.11  International reserves outside the United States 300  Hans Genberg and Alexander K. Swoboda 
5.6.4  Simulation of Scenarios That Would Have Prevented the Reserve 
Explosion 
If  we accept the view that the estimated model does capture the essential 
aspects of the inflation-money  growth-reserve distribution nexus under Bret- 
ton Woods, then we can use it to look at the consequences of some counterfac- 
tual changes in the variables we have assumed to be exogenou~.~~  Figures 5.12 
and 5.13 show the consequences of two types of policy aimed at limiting the 
explosion in international reserves that took place in 1970 and 1971. In the 
first, we assume that domestic assets of  the central banks outside the United 
States increase in  1970:l and  stay above the historical path by  a constant 
amount thereafter.39  We  note that this policy indeed leads to a loss of reserves 
(relative to the control solution that was run with historical values of the ex- 
ogenous variables), which accumulates rather quickly. The increase in domes- 
tic assets leads to an initial increase in the money supply, but this increase is 
offset by the reserve loss so that, after one year, only 33 percent of the initial 
expansion remains. The world price level increases temporarily as a result of 
the expansionary policy. 
Figure 5.13 shows the consequences of a reduction in the level of the U.S. 
money supply taking effect in the first quarter of  1970 and remaining at the 
new level until the end of the sample. The fall in international reserve holdings 
is again visible. This time, however, there is a permanent reduction in the 
money supply outside the United States and a permanent fall in the world 
price level. The asymmetry between the policies originating in the United 
States, on the one hand, and those originating in the rest of G10 countries, on 
the other, that is built into the model as a long-run property emerges clearly 
after only a few quarters, a consequence of  the size of the estimated adjust- 
ment parameters in equations (5) and (6). 
The last exogenous change that we investigate is a switch in the demand for 
money to dollars from other currencies, leaving the total demand unchanged. 
This has the consequence of decreasing the equilibrium level of international 
reserves outside the United States and setting in motion an adjustment that 
involves not only a decrease in actual reserve holdings but also a fall in the 
world money supply and a fall in the world price level (see fig. 5.14). This 
process is exactly the same (but with the opposite sign) as that suggested by 
38. Two shortcomings of  the model should be kept in  mind when the following simulation 
results are interpreted.  The first concerns the treatment of real output as an exogenous variable 
that is not influenced by monetary policy even in the short run. The second is the assumption of 
the exogeneity of the U.S. money stock. It would clearly be desirable to relax these assumptions 
in future research. For the present, we limit ourselves to pointing out, in our commentary on the 
breakdown of  Bretton Woods in sec.  5.7, that its timing was partly the result of out-of-phase 
business cycles in the United States and the rest of the world, evoking divergent policy responses 
in the two regions (expansionary in the United States, restrictive elsewhere). 
39. The example is chosen in view of illustrating the properties of the model and the adjustment 
mechanisms that we think were important in the Bretton Woods system rather than with the inten- 
tion of suggesting what policies should have been pursued. 301  The Provision of  Liquidity in the Bretton Woods System 
Deviations from control solution 
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Heller (1976) as a partial explanation for the observed explosion of reserves 
in 1970 and 1971  .40 Although the model that we have estimated and simulated 
in this section is quite simple, we believe that it captures the essence of  the 
adjustment and liquidity mechanisms in the latter years of the Bretton Woods 
era. It shows clearly how the provision of  liquidity in the system was an en- 
dogenous response to monetary policies in the member countries and to the 
asymmetry that  characterized the  arrangement. This view  of  the  Bretton 
Woods system has important implications for the interpretation of its break- 
down, a topic to which we now turn. 
5.7  International Liquidity and the Breakdown of Bretton Woods+ 
The Bretton Woods regime broke down “formally” on 15 August 1971. Its 
collapse followed on, or coincided with, the explosion of the U.S. deficit in 
1970. It is thus tempting to attribute the breakdown to an excessive creation 
of international liquidity or, alternatively, to the absence of an adequate exter- 
nal adjustment mechanism, at least of  the U.S.  balance of  payments. The 
empirical evidence and the analysis presented in the previous sections, how- 
ever, caution against such an interpretation. The breakdown did not occur be- 
cause adjustment was sluggish or functioning badly in an  economic sense 
40. It should be  noted that the model estimated in this section is capable of explaining the 
41. The following analysis is in part based on Swoboda (1991). 
explosion of  reserves without reference to instability in the demand for money functions. 302  Hans Genberg and Alexander K. Swoboda 
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given the nature of the prevailing international monetary regime. On the con- 
trary, the system was adjusting all too well and very speedily to the shocks to 
which it was subjected, adjusting in a way that was entirely consistent with its 
inner logic. 
On a very general level of  analysis, a major reason for the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods was that the predominance of  the United States came under 
attack. The reconstruction of Europe and the emerging power of Japan meant 
that the relative economic and political strength of  the United States had de- 
clined from its height at the end of the Second World War, paving the way for 
a political challenge to its dominance. In  addition, economic policy in the 
United States, which until the mid-1960s had been broadly consistent with the 
interests of  some of  its major partners, turned more lax, and therefore less 
acceptable, thereafter. The U.S.  rate of  inflation, which had been below the 
average “world” rate of inflation until 1965, began to rise toward that average 
in the next two years and rose above it after 1967. 
The timing of the breakdown did indeed coincide with the explosion of the 
U.S. payments deficit in 1970. That explosion can be explained by our model 
of  endogenous reserve creation and distribution without the need to invoke 
such notions as speculative attacks on  the dollar, disequilibrium exchange 
rates, or exogenous increases in international liquidity. 
As we have suggested in section 5.6.3 above, a confluence of demand and 
supply pressures generated a growing excess supply of  dollars in  the late 
1960s and early  1970s. A high, and increasing, degree of  capital mobility 
rapidly transformed these excess supplies into a U.S. payments deficit and a 
corresponding explosion of  reserves elsewhere.  As figure 5.8 above illus- 
trates, demand pressures had already started to build up  in  1967. For about 
two years, these were countered by relatively moderate money supply behav- 
i~r.~*  This changed in  1969 and, especially, in  1970. The evolution of  real 
incomes in the two regions continued to put pressure on the U.S. balance of 
payments, and a relatively more expansionary American monetary policy now 
added to this pressure. A desynchronization of the business cycle in the two 
regions, combined with national monetary policies that were being assigned 
to internal balance rather than to external balance, thus destabilized the fixed- 
exchange-rate regime. High capital mobility ensured that these inconsisten- 
cies rapidly precipitated the breakdown of that regime. 
The basic implication of our analysis is thus that the Bretton Woods regime 
did not collapse because it endemically provided excessive liquidity. In one 
sense,  it provided just  the right amount of  liquidity given its  inner logic. 
42. It is important to keep in mind that what matters for reserve flows is the evolution of money 
demand and money supply determinants in the United States relative to their evolution in the rest 
of the world. The combined supply in the two regions relative to the combined demand, on the 
other hand, will determine the evolution of world inflation. Thus, it is quite possible that aggregate 
monetary policy was too expansionary for price stability in the period 1967-68  at the same time 
as money supply growth in the United States was lower than elsewhere and therefore did not yet 
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Rather, it was an unwillingness to live up to the consequences of  that logic 
that was the fundamental cause of the breakdown.43  Reserve creation was an 
endogenous variable in the regime. Given the regime, the only way to avoid 
its untoward consequence, the excessive world rate of  inflation, would have 
been a more moderate increase in the U.S. rate of monetary expansion. Such 
moderation would have avoided the dramatic increase in dollar reserves out- 
side the United States. That increase could also have been avoided, even given 
the high actual rate of  U.S. monetary expansion, had the rest of  the world 
accelerated domestic credit creation. But, in that case, world inflation would 
have been as high as, or even higher than, it actually was. 
5.8  Implications for the Design of Fixed-Rate Regimes 
The  implications  of  the  preceding  analysis  for  the  design  of  fixed- 
exchange-rate regimes, notably of the European Monetary Union (EMU) va- 
riety, are rather obvious. We  will comment briefly on only two such implica- 
tions by way of conclusion. 
In the first place, it is in the logic of fixed-exchange-rate systems that na- 
tional monetary policy  loses its autonomy, or, to put it another way,  that it 
spreads to the rest of the world and is effective (in the long run) only insofar 
as it affects the fixed-exchange-rate area’s aggregate rate of monetary expan- 
sion. The way  in which the area’s aggregate money stock is determined is 
therefore of  the utmost importance to monetary conditions in the area as a 
whole. That way, in turn, depends largely on the specific institutional arrange- 
ments governing national holding patterns of international reserves-interna- 
tional liquidity if you wish. These arrangements (together with other factors 
such as countries’ sizes) determine the effective power of individual countries 
in setting the area’s common monetary policy. If  changes in international re- 
serves predominantly take the form of changes in holdings of claims on one 
of  the member countries, the provision and distribution of  international li- 
quidity within the area becomes largely endogenous, and the monetary policy 
of  the reserve currency issuing country broadly sets the common monetary 
policy.  This is why the design of  the exchange-rate pegging arrangements 
within the EMU and that of the proposed European Central Bank are of  such 
importance. It also suggests that the continuation of present European Mone- 
tary System arrangements is predicated on Germany remaining a low-inflation 
country within the area. 
The loss of monetary autonomy implied by fixed exchange rates, even for a 
43. We thus do not consider that the system itself was internally flawed. We prefer to speak  of 
inconsistencies between the logic of that system, which says that fixed exchange rates, high capi- 
tal mobility, and independent monetary policies are incompatible, and the actual conduct of  poli- 
cies. This does not mean of  course that policies should necessarily have been subordinated to the 
maintenance of  the system. Dealing with that issue requires evaluating the costs and benefits of 
fixed vs. flexible exchange rates. 305  The Provision of Liquidity in the Bretton Woods System 
large region that holds its reserves in foreign exchange, as the Bretton Woods 
regime demonstrates, has a further implication for the design of a European 
Central Bank. To  the extent that that bank's charter specifies, as we believe it 
should, the pursuit of price stability as its primary objective, it should not be 
required to stabilize the value of the ecu in terms of the dollar within an im- 
posed band. For a conflict may otherwise arise between the European Central 
Bank's price stability objective and its exchange-rate stabilization obligations. 
Such obligations should not be undertaken until such a  time as a universal 
reform of  the international  monetary system, and possibly the creation of  a 
world central bank and currency, takes place. 
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Comment  Stanley W.  Black 
This paper has the care and elegance that we have come to expect from Hans 
Genberg and Alexander Swoboda in discussing the international monetarist 
point of view. But it is a decidedly idiosyncratic view of international liquid- 
ity, in my opinion. Unlike the authors of the Bretton Woods Agreement, Gen- 
berg and Swoboda assume a high degree of international capital mobility. As 
they say, they “must focus on an aggregate broader than international reserves 
narrowly defined if capital mobility is perfect since, in that case, certain do- 
mestic assets are, by  assumption, perfect substitutes for the central bank’s 
foreign assets.” So they focus on the entire domestic monetary base. This may 
seem appropriate in Switzerland, where the domestic component of the mon- 
etary base is composed of Swiss francs. But it seems highly doubtful for most 
members of the International Monetary Fund with convertible currencies dur- 
ing the Bretton Woods period. 
Stanley W.  Black is the Georges Lurcy Professor of  Economics at the University of  North 
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In their discussion of  the role of international liquidity in the Keynes and 
White plans and in the Articles of Agreement of  the International Monetary 
Fund, they focus on the provision of  liquidity without in my  view giving a 
satisfactory  definition of itsfunction. Therefore I will offer my own. 
Central banks have been established in most countries to regulate the qual- 
ity of domestic money, conceived of as a device to facilitate transactions in the 
marketplace and to act as a temporary store of value and as a unit of account 
for contracts. Such regulation is required to avoid fraud and counterfeiting 
and to ensure the exchangeability  of different types of money such as currency 
and bank deposits for each other at par. 
International trade conducted between residents of countries using different 
currencies requires access to foreign exchange. Full exploitation of the bene- 
fits of comparative advantage requires unrestricted convertibility between do- 
mestic and foreign currency for both domestic and foreign residents at essen- 
tially the same rate of exchange. Such convertibility is not a simple matter to 
achieve. Only about 30 percent of the members of the International Monetary 
Fund can do so. 
Maintenance of convertibility requires the holding of  sufficient hard cur- 
rency reserves either in the central bank or in commercial banks to guarantee 
the continued access to foreign exchange of domestic residents. This is true 
under floating exchange rates as well as under pegged rates. At times, coun- 
tries such as France, Italy, Great Britain, and even the United States have had 
convertibility problems. 
Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility, there is no such problem 
since domestic and foreign assets are by  assumption perfect substitutes. But 
for the large majority of  the world’s population that does not live in a hard 
currency or reserve center country, convertibility is a continuing problem, one 
that the Bretton Woods system was designed to deal with. A major purpose of 
the founding of the International Monetary Fund was “to assist in the estab- 
lishment of  a multilateral system of  payments in respect of current transac- 
tions among members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions 
which hamper the growth of world trade” (Article I). 
Genberg and Swoboda rightly describe the monetary standard of the Bret- 
ton Woods system as a gold exchange standard that evolved toward a dollar 
standard. Their depiction of this evolution rests on the “global monetarist” 
model involving a region of fixed exchange rates linked by goods market ar- 
bitrage into a common world inflation rate determined by the evolution of the 
world monetary base, a money multiplier, and the growth of the demand for 
world money. 
They argue that “the industrialized countries’ economies were sufficiently 
integrated between 1959 and 1971 for this view to have a great deal of  short- 
mn relevance.” Now there is no doubt that, as a simplification, there is a great 
deal of  truth in this statement. However, I cannot help but feel that it is an 
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the multiple reasons for the breakdown of the system, and imposes an over- 
arching view, to use Anna Schwartz’s words, that participants and originators 
of the Bretton Woods system would not have agreed to as relevant. 
Specifically, Keynes rejected the quantity theory as an explanation of  be- 
havior for the domestic economy. And he certainly rejected the implications 
of Hume’s law “rules of the game” for international monetary arrangements. 
So did White and his associates. They explicitly designed a system that would 
nor have to allow domestic monetary policy to be completely dominated by 
external factors. 
Obstfeld (chap. 4  in this volume) argues effectively that the Bretton Woods 
system involved  substantial sterilization of  reserve flows.  Alan  Stockman 
(chap. 6 in this volume) believes that the Bretton Woods system did not work 
according to a simple model.  He  finds it difficult to determine whether all 
countries had the same inflation rate. The data suggest to him that “countries 
had some scope for monetary-policy independence,” at least according to “the 
natural interpretation of the evidence.” 
In support of their view, Genberg and Swoboda present their model of the 
1959-71  Bretton Woods system as a world dollar standard. The model of 
equations (l)-(4) is indeed simple, but it is allowed to become more realistic 
by  two dynamic adjustment equations ([5])  and [6]). The first shows the re- 
sponse of  world inflation to monetary growth, while the second gives the 
relation of the non-U.S. industrialized countries’ reserve holdings to the ex- 
cess demand for money. The latter depends in equation (10) on the difference 
between the demand for base money outside the United States and the domes- 
tic source base of money outside the United States, with a lag in adjustment, 
as in Hume’s law. 
The model seems to work well enough statistically, although I have three 
questions to raise about it. First, it is surprising that the quarterly demand for 
world money (9)  can be estimated with no lags. Second, Rabin and Pratt’s 
criticism of Heller addressed not the relation between money and inflation, as 
asserted by  Genberg and Swoboda, but the relation between reserve growth 
and money growth.’ In Genberg and Swoboda’s work, this takes the form of 
equations (6) and (10). Their estimates of that relation over the shorter sample 
1959:  1-1968:4 excluding the breakdown period  show a significantly lower 
speed of adjustment (.  13 vs. .24)  and unsatisfactory estimates of the income 
elasticities, as compared with their results over the complete sample. The out- 
of-sample simulations of the model in figures 5.10  and 5.1  1 are far less im- 
pressive as explanations of the explosion of reserves outside the United States 
than was the simulation in figure 5.8.  I believe that this weakens the support 
for their model of global monetarism since the strength of the reserve-money 
1. See A. Rabin and L. J. hatt, “A Note on Heller’s Use of Regression Analysis,”International 
Monetary Fund Staff Papers 28 (1981): 225-29;  and Robert Heller, “International Reserves and 
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link depends on the inclusion of the enormous explosion of  base money in 
1970-71  as the system broke down. 
My third question has to do with the fact that the model makes it appear 
that nothing was wrong with the system until  1969. Figure 5.9 shows that, 
“until the end of  1967, neither the supply nor the demand side generated any 
significant pressure on reserve outflows from the United States.” Only in 1969 
and 1970 did “a relatively more expansionary” American monetary policy, in 
conjunction with demand factors, generate a balance-of-payments deficit for 
the United States. Genberg and Swoboda argue that the evidence shows that 
the only way  to  have avoided a breakdown in the Bretton Woods  system 
“would have been a more moderate increase in the U.S. rate of  monetary 
expansion.” Now  it is well-known that there was pressure on U.S.  gold re- 
serves beginning as early as 1960, shortly after the resumption of convertibil- 
ity in Europe. The Gold Pool effort to stabilize the London gold price began 
in  1960 and was formalized in  1962. The pressure was generated by  the in- 
creasing undervaluation of  gold at $35.00 an ounce in the context of  the 
gold-dollar exchange system. Paul De Grauwe has recently pointed  to the 
gold-dollar exchange standard as breaking down because of the application of 
Gresham’s law.* 
Given their model, Genberg and Swoboda show that it is capable of repro- 
ducing some of the features of the breakdown, if shocked with an increase in 
U.S. monetary growth or a shift in portfolio preferences from U.S. to foreign 
money demand. With this viewpoint, they conclude that the system broke 
down  not  because it  was  flawed but because of  excessive U.S.  monetary 
growth, combined with the unwillingness of a resurgent Europe to accept the 
rate of inflation imposed by U.S. monetary policy. 
This view contains much of the truth. But I would argue that it omits some 
important factors, including the gold-dollar problem mentioned above. Rob- 
ert Mundell described the combination of  capital mobility and pegged ex- 
change rates with independent monetary policies and sterilized reserve flows 
as  an  “international disequilibrium system.”’  Thus,  the  system  itself  was 
flawed, not merely or only U.S.  behavior. I would add that the automatic 
financing of U.S.  deficits provided by the system was a fatal temptation to a 
U.S. government that has always put domestic policy concerns first. In  the 
late 1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson was desperately seeking to finance 
the Vietnam War  and a domestic War  on Poverty at the same time without 
raising taxes. So I would argue, with others, that the logic of the system was 
flawed and that, in combination with the factors cited by Genberg and Swo- 
boda, this led to the breakdown of the system. 
One point on which I would disagree with Genberg and Swoboda is their 
2. See Paul De Grauwe, international  Money: Postwar Trends and Theories (Oxford: Oxford 
3.  See Robert Mundell, “The International Disequilibrium System,”  Kyklos 14 (1961): 154-72. 
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characterization of  the Bretton Woods system as “adjusting all too well and 
very speedily to the shocks to which it was subjected.” The global monetarist 
viewpoint imposes a high speed of  adjustment on a system that instead suf- 
fered from reluctant  adjustment,  both  in  the  surplus countries and  in  the 
United States. 
Finally, what should be concluded about liquidity under the Bretton Woods 
system? I would say that it was the standard of  liquidity, the gold-exchange 
standard, that was flawed and that excessive reliance on U.S.  liabilities as 
reserve assets sowed the seeds of its failure. Otherwise, however, the arrange- 
ments for providing liquidity to member nations of the International Monetary 
Fund and setting up rules for the appropriate use of liquidity and the balance 
between adjustment and financing that are laid out in the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement are issues with which any monetary system should and must deal. 
Comment  John Williamson 
It is almost inevitable that the author of a survey article cited as an example of 
the conventional wisdom of a previous generation will judge a paper like this 
in terms of  what he perceives to be progress and regress vis-i-vis his own 
work, and I shall not attempt to resist the temptation to do what comes natu- 
rally. 
The most significant progress is Alexander Swoboda’s definitive clarifica- 
tion of the determinants of the aggregate money supply of a fixed-exchange- 
rate area under alternative institutional arrangements.’ Had I written my  sur- 
vey article after that paper, my treatment of the determinants of reserve supply 
would surely have been substantially better. 
I cannot, however, agree with the authors that the traditional analysis ne- 
glected the questions about the relation between reserves, money supply, and 
inflation on which they focus. On the contrary, my own survey article chris- 
tened the hypothesis that they favor the “international quantity theory” and 
treated its testing as one of  the principal unresolved issues in the field. Gen- 
berg and Swoboda essentially assume it to be true, without presenting evi- 
dence that seems particularly pertinent to the issue. That is regress, not pro- 
gress. 
One of the foundations of the international quantity theory-the  theory that 
the evolution of a world reserve base drives world inflation-is  that reserves 
constitute a constant fraction of the monetary base in each country. Genberg 
and Swoboda assume this to be true and ignore the alternative hypothesis (pio- 
John Williamson is a senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics. This comment 
is copyright 0 1992, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. All rights reserved. 
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neered by  that reserves are treated as inventories that derive their util- 
ity by fluctuating so as to permit the stabilization of other variables of greater 
welfare significance, like output. It is not clear to me that this hypothesis is 
inconsistent with their empirical results since most versions of the inventory 
view of  reserves also predict that reserves will grow in line with nominal in- 
come in the long run, but it is difficult to be sure when the competing views 
are not clearly specified in such a way as to draw out their contrasting impli- 
cations. 
They also assume that the Bretton Woods system was fundamentally a dol- 
lar standard, despite an interesting passage in which they point out that the 
Fund’s Articles “were in fact compatible with a variety of possible intema- 
tional standards”-a  gold bullion standard, a gold exchange standard, or a 
dollar standard. At one point they even admit that “to some extent” it did 
operate as a gold exchange standard and merely claim that it evolved toward a 
dollar standard “in the late  1960s and . . . at the margin.” Yet,  when they 
come to  specify and estimate a model of  how  the  Bretton Woods  system 
worked, it is an uncompromising model of the dollar standard-which  is cer- 
tainly not what the authors of Bretton Woods thought they were creating.3 
My own view4 has always been that the system remained essentially a gold 
exchange standard until 1968, at which point the adoption of the two-tier gold 
market (and its implicit threat that the United States would retaliate for any 
extensive use of the legal right to buy gold at the official price by closing the 
gold window) transformed the system into a dollar standard. (I also take the 
view that a dollar standard was emotionally unacceptable to the rest of  the 
world, which meant that this could be only a very temporary solution.) One 
question posed by the paper is whether the success of Genberg and Swoboda 
in fitting their model to the data compels a reassessment of that position. The 
key question is whether U.S. monetary policy was unconstrained by the U.S. 
reserve position prior to 1968, as is hypothesized by equation (3). That equa- 
tion is not in fact tested in the present paper: instead, the authors appeal to 
empirical evidence presented in an earlier paper, which showed a degree of 
asymmetry in the response to U.S. as opposed to foreign monetary policy but 
also decisively refuted the hypothesis that only U.S.  monetary policy mat- 
ter~.~  Note that Giovannini concluded that the Bretton Woods system had been 
2. See Robert Triffin, “National Central Banking  and the International Economy,” Review oj 
Economic Studies 14 (February 1947): 53-75. 
3. See, e.g.,  Bordo (chap. 1 in this volume); McKinnon (Comment on chap. 13 in this volume); 
or John Williamson, “Keynes and the International Economic Order,” in Keynes and the Modern 
World, ed. D. Worswick and J. Trevithick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
4. Which seems to coincide with that of Bordo (but not McKinnon). 
5. See Hans Genberg and Alexander K. Swoboda, “Gold and the Dollar: Asymmetries in World 
Money Stock Determination, 1959-1971 ,” in The International Monetary System under Flexible 
Exchange Rates: Global, Regional and National, ed. R. N. Cooper, P.  B. Kenen, J. B. de Ma- 
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distinctly more symmetrical than the European Monetary System or even the 
gold standard.6 
Thus, neither of the crucial disputes between the traditional (Triffinesque) 
view of how Bretton Woods worked, and would collapse, and the revisionist 
monetarist  view  of  what  it was  all  about are illuminated by  the empirical 
model of the paper. The success of Genberg and Swoboda in getting a reason- 
able fit for their model does not compel one to accept their quixotic explana- 
tion for the breakdown of Bretton Woods. 
That breakdown  had nothing to do with  a political  attack on U.S.  hege- 
mony.  On the contrary, the main enthusiast for subverting the monetary lead- 
ership of  the  United  States  had  been  unceremoniously  removed  from  the 
world  scene by  the French people shortly before,  having tried but failed to 
induce other countries to join France in mounting an official run on the dollar 
during his years in power. The breakdown was instead a consequence of the 
failure  to  make  timely  repairs  and  renovations  to the  system  designed  by 
Keynes and White for a world of low inflation, without capital mobility, and 
with ample gold stocks. That system was in many ways a very attractive one: 
it largely succeeded in avoiding a waste of resources on unnecessary unem- 
ployment,  in preventing the competitive use of exchange-rage policy, and in 
desynchronizing the business cycle internationally while building in an early 
warning signal of emerging inflationary pressures and providing an automatic 
stabilizer that would limit the damage caused by excess demand (in terms of 
a  buildup  of  inflationary  momentum)  until  needed  deflationary  measures 
could become effective.’ 
However, by the late  1960s, the system needed reforming in order to ac- 
commodate  differential  inflation  and  to  provide  an  acceptable  adjustment 
mechanism that was still usable in the presence of capital mobility, as well as 
to supplement the supply of reserves. Genberg and Swoboda attack the con- 
tention that the breakdown was caused by  the lack of  an adjustment mecha- 
nism by arguing that “the system was adjusting all too well and very speedily 
to the shocks to which it was subjected, adjusting in a way that was entirely 
consistent with its inner logic .” Instead, the problem was “national monetary 
policies that were being assigned to internal balance.” Now if there is any one 
core element of the Bretton Woods system-something  on which Keynes and 
White agreed, that dominated the design of policy throughout the period when 
the system functioned, that motivated the alternative strand of theorizing that 
Genberg  and  Swoboda neglect in their paper-it  was the primacy  given to 
continuous  pursuit  of  internal  balance.  To  say that adjustment would  have 
6. See Albert0 Giovannini, “How Do Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes Work: The Evidence from 
the Gold Standard, Bretton Woods, and the EMS,” in Blueprints for  Exchange Rate Management, 
ed. M. Miller, B. Eichengreen, and R.  Portes (New York:  Academic,  1988). 
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been feasible if  only policymakers had not worried about internal balance is 
like saying that crime could be ended by  abolishing all laws-technically 
true, but hardly helpful. 
I am of course well aware that practicing monetarists do not share the con- 
viction that policy is able to do much to help preserve internal balance, but 
that is a proposition that should be debated on its merits and not taken as an 
axiom. Actually, even monetarists concede that policy can limit inflation, so 
it is a bit surprising to find Genberg and Swoboda arguing that the rest of the 
world could have avoided the breakdown by accelerating domestic credit cre- 
ation, at the cost of increased inflation. That point is also technically true, but 
hardly helpful as policy advice. 
Thus, the primary cause of  the breakdown of  Bretton Woods was the ab- 
sence of an adjustment mechanism that respected the core value of the system, 
namely, the preservation of internal balance, as well as being compatible with 
the degree of capital mobility that had developed by the late 1960s. Had that 
lack been remedied in good time, by adoption of  the crawling peg in a form 
that gave the United States the right to devalue the dollar at its own initiative, 
the reformed Bretton Woods system could have survived the monetary adven- 
tures of the Nixon administration. 
Genberg and Swoboda are also on dubious ground in arguing that a Euro- 
pean Central Bank committed to the pursuit of  price stability as a primary 
objective “should not be required to stabilize the value of the ecu in terms of 
the dollar within an imposed band.” What is true is that a commitment to price 
stability is incompatible with the defense of  a constant nominal band. But 
there is no inconsistency if  a wide band is defined in real terms, so that the 
nominal band is adjusted automatically in response to differential inflation. 
Suppose that such a system of limited flexibility-a  wide band combined with 
a crawling peg-had  already been in effect in 1969. The relaxation of  U.S. 
monetary policy at the end of  that year would then have led the dollar to 
depreciate toward the bottom of its band, giving Europe short-run protection 
against the outflow of dollars and the acceleration of  inflation in the United 
States. As American inflation increased, the par value of  the dollar would 
have depreciated, thus maintaining the European defense against imported 
inflation. When the executive directors of the IMF threw out these proposals 
for limited flexibility during their drafting of the exchange rate report,8 they 
condemned the world to the certainty that Bretton Woods would break down 
and that the many good features of the best monetary regime the world has 
ever known would be lost in the process. We  have been paying the price ever 
since. 
8. International Monetary Fund, The Role of  Exchange Rates in the Adjustment of International 
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General Discussion 
Ronald McKinnon argued that the story that Bretton Woods’s collapse was due 
to an excess supply of money created by the United States was incomplete. 
He  argued that the data on U.S.  monetary aggregates do not display a big 
enough jump in the late 1960s. The factor that he believed best explains the 
event was currency substitution-a  massive shift in demand away from dollar 
assets toward other convertible currencies. The dollar was talked down by 
authorities who believed that it was overvalued because of  the diminishing 
current account surplus. This was perceived by the foreign exchange market, 
leading to a run on dollar assets. Paul Krugman agreed that the collapse was 
due to a widespread perception that the dollar was overvalued in real terms. 
Maurice Obsgeld posited another mechanism whereby a change in the de- 
mand rather than the supply of money could have precipitated collapse-a 
pure expectational shift. He argued that, if a dollar devaluation was suddenly 
expected, this would cause U.S. interest rates to rise and European rates to 
fall, in turn leading to shifts in money demand like those that would occur 
under currency substitution. Robert Mundell argued that, once gold became 
demonetized in March 1968, this eliminated the gold component of  usable 
resources, in turn fostering a large increase in the demand for international 
reserves. 
Richard Cooper elaborated on the point (based on annual changes in the 
U.S. monetary base from 1963 to 1972) that U.S.  monetary aggregates did 
not accelerate sufficiently before 1971 to produce the collapse. He pointed out 
that there was an explosion in international reserves, but not the base, in the 
late 1960s. The base accelerated in 1972, only after the gold-dollar link was 
completely severed. 
Robert Solomon described how the big explosion of reserves in the surplus 
countries and the massive U.S. balance-of-payments deficit in 1970-71  came 
about. U.S. interest rates were relatively high in the second half of the 1960s 
and attracted funds from the Eurodollar market, especially as U.S. banks bor- 
rowed from their branches in Europe. The drain of funds from Europe gave 
the United States an official settlement surplus in 1968 and 1969. The pattern 
was reversed in 1970, when the United States went into recession, reducing 
interest rates. U.S. banks repaid their branches in Europe. These funds flowed 
back to Europe, swelling reserves. The increase in European reserves then 
fostered speculation of imminent realignment of exchange rates. 
Both Maurice Obstfeld and Paul Krugman argued that, in the face of perfect 
capital mobility, the traditional concepts of  reserves and liquidity were not 
meaningful. 
Finally, Max Corden suggested that the fundamental flaw of  the Bretton 
Woods system was not the lack of an adjustment mechanism, as John William- 
son had argued in his Comment, because the system did allow for changes in 
the exchange rate. The problem was that countries did not use the exchange- 315  The Provision of Liquidity in the Bretton Woods System 
rate adjustment mechanism. Surplus countries opposed devaluation because 
of concern over the competitiveness of  their export industries. Deficit coun- 
tries opposed devaluation because of  concern over speculation. For Corden, 
the fundamental flaw in the system was capital mobility-that  an adjustable 
peg system could not be reconciled with high capital mobility. This Page Intentionally Left Blank